

## The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates

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### ABSTRACT

Expectations about long-term earnings growth are crucial to valuation models and cost of capital estimates. We analyze historical long-term growth rates across a broad cross section of stocks using several indicators of operating performance. We test for persistence and predictability in growth. While some firms have grown at high rates historically, they are relatively rare instances. There is no persistence in long-term earnings growth beyond chance, and there is low predictability even with a wide variety of predictor variables. Specifically, IBES growth forecasts are overly optimistic and add little predictive power. Valuation ratios also have limited ability to predict future growth.

THE EXPECTED RATE of growth in future cash flows (usually proxied by accounting earnings) plays a pivotal role in financial management and investment analysis. In the context of aggregate market valuation, for example, projections about future growth are instrumental in predicting the equity risk premium. Much current controversy surrounds the appropriate level of the equity risk premium, as well as whether recent market valuation levels (at least as of year-end 1999) can be justified (Asness (2000), Welch (2000), Fama and French (2002)). Debate also revolves around how much of the performance of equity asset classes, such as large glamour stocks, can be attributed to changes in profitability growth (Fama and French (1995), Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2000)). When applied to the valuation of individual stocks, projected growth rates have implications for the cross-sectional distribution of cost of capital estimates (Fama and French (1997), Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)), as well as widely followed valuation ratios like price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios.

Common measures of expected growth in future earnings, such as valuation ratios and analysts' growth forecasts, vary greatly across stocks. In the case of price-to-earnings multiples for the IBES universe of U.S. firms, for example, at

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year-end 1999, the distribution of the stock price relative to the consensus forecast of the following year's earnings has a 90th percentile of 53.9, while the 10th percentile is 7.4, yielding a difference of 46.5. Firms with a record of sustained, strong past growth in earnings are heavily represented among those trading at high multiples. Security analysts issue positive recommendations for these stocks and forecast buoyant future prospects. Other stocks with a history of disappointing past growth are shunned by the investment community. They are priced at low multiples and analysts are unexcited about their outlook. Putting aside the possibility of mispricing, one reason for the disparity in multiples is differences in risk. At the level of individual stocks, however, the relation between risk and expected return is weak (Fama and French (1992)). It is thus unlikely that the large dispersion is driven primarily by risk (the evidence in Beaver and Morse (1978) also supports this view). Rather, if the pricing is rational, most of the cross-sectional variation reflects differences in expected growth rates. A more direct measure of the market's expectations, security analysts' forecasts of long-term growth in earnings, also displays large differences across stocks. For example, the 90th percentile of the distribution of IBES five-year forecasts is 40 percent as of year-end 1999, compared to the 10th percentile of 8.9 percent. If analysts and investors do not believe that future earnings growth is forecastable, they would predict the same growth rate (the unconditional mean of the distribution) for all companies, and it is unlikely that the dispersion in forecasts or price-earnings ratios would be as large as it actually is.

Based on market valuations and analysts' forecasts, then, there is a widespread belief among market participants that future earnings growth is highly predictable. However, economic intuition suggests that there should not be much consistency in a firm's profitability growth. Following superior growth in profits, competitive pressures should ultimately tend to dilute future growth. Exit from an unprofitable line of business should tend to raise the remaining firms' future growth rates. Some support for this logic comes from Fama and French (2002). Their evidence for the aggregate market suggests that while there is some short-term forecastability, earnings growth is in general unpredictable.

In short, there may be a sharp discrepancy between share valuations along with analysts' predictions on the one hand, and realized operating performance growth on the other. The discrepancy may reflect investors' judgmental biases or agency distortions in analysts' behavior. In any event, the divergence is potentially large, judging from current market conditions. For instance, take a firm with a ratio of price to forecasted earnings of 100. Such cases are by no means minor irregularities: based on values at year-end 1999, they represent about 11.9 percent of total market capitalization. To infer the growth expectations implicit in such a price earnings ratio, we adopt a number of conservative assumptions. In particular, suppose the multiple reverts to a more representative value of 20 in 10 years, during which time investors are content to accept a rate of return on the stock of zero (assume there are no dividends). A multiple of 20 is conservative, since Siegel (1999) argues that a ratio of 14 may not be an unreasonable long-term value. Further, an adjustment period of 10 years is not short, in light of the fact that many of the largest firms at year-end 1999 did not exist 10 years ago. These

assumptions imply that earnings must grow by a factor of five, or at a rate of about 17.5 percent per year, for the next 10 years. Alternatively, suppose investors put up with a paltry 10 percent rate of return (Welch (2000), reports that financial economists' consensus expected return is considerably higher). Then earnings must grow at an even more stellar rate (29.2 percent per year) over 10 years to justify the current multiple.

The above example highlights the two questions we tackle in this paper. How plausible are investors' and analysts' expectations that many stocks will be able to sustain high growth rates over prolonged periods? Are firms that can consistently achieve such high growth rates identifiable *ex ante*? We begin by documenting the distribution of growth rates realized over horizons of 1, 5, and 10 years. This evidence lets us evaluate the likelihood of living up to the expectations of growth that are implicit in market valuation ratios. To justify rich valuations, investors must believe that high growth persists over many years. Accordingly, we also examine whether there is persistence in operating performance growth. Individual firms' earnings and incomes can be very erratic, so a robust empirical design is a crucial consideration. We employ nonparametric tests on multiple indicators of operating performance across a large cross section of stocks over relatively long horizons. In addition, we focus our tests for persistence by examining subsets of firms where future growth is more likely to be predictable (e.g., stocks in the technology sector and stocks which have displayed persistence in past growth). To give the benefit of the doubt to the possibility of persistence, we relax the definition of consistency in growth and redo our tests. Finally, we expand the list of variables to forecast growth beyond past growth rates. We examine whether valuation measures, such as earnings yields and ratios of book-to-market equity and sales-to-price, are associated with growth on an *ex ante* as well as *ex post* basis. Security analysts' earnings forecasts are also widely used as measures of the market's expectations of growth in future earnings. As a check on the quality of analysts' predictions, we evaluate how well realized growth rates align with IBES consensus forecasts.

Our main findings are as follows. Our median estimate of the growth rate of operating performance corresponds closely to the growth rate of gross domestic product over the sample period. Although there are instances where firms achieve spectacular growth, they are fairly rare. For instance, only about 10 percent of firms grow at a rate in excess of 18 percent per year over 10 years. Sales growth shows some persistence, but there is essentially no persistence or predictability in growth of earnings across all firms. Even in cases that are popularly associated with phenomenal growth (pharmaceutical and technology stocks, growth stocks, and firms that have experienced persistently high past growth), signs of persistent growth in earnings are slim. Security analysts' long-term growth estimates tend to be overoptimistic and contribute very little to predicting realized growth over longer horizons. Market valuation ratios have little ability to discriminate between firms with high or low future earnings growth. An expanded set of forecasting variables also has scant success in predicting future earnings growth. All in all, our evidence on the limited predictability of earnings growth suggests that investors should be wary of stocks that trade at very high

multiples. Very few firms are able to live up to the high hopes for consistent growth that are built into such rich valuations.

Related prior research in the financial literature on the behavior of earnings growth is meager. Little (1962) and Little and Rayner (1966) examine the growth in earnings of a limited sample of U.K. firms in the 1950s. Early evidence for U.S. firms is provided by Lintner and Glauber (1967) and Brealey (1983). Beaver (1970) and Ball and Watts (1972) start a long line of papers that apply time-series models to earnings. However, few firms have sufficiently long earnings histories to allow precise estimation of model parameters, and the emphasis in this line of work has been on short-term forecasting. More recently, Fama and French (2002) examine the time-series predictability of aggregate earnings for the market. Our work is closest in spirit to that of Fama and French (2000), who look at the cross-sectional predictability of firms' earnings, but even they focus on one-year horizons.

A much larger number of studies by academics and practitioners rely on estimates of expected long-term earnings growth for stock valuation, or for estimating firms' cost of capital. A selective list includes Bakshi and Chen (1998), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001). In particular, many studies use long-term consensus IBES forecasts for expected growth rates (see, e.g., Mezrich et al. (2001)). Given the widespread use of IBES long-term estimates, it is important to evaluate their correspondence with realized growth rates.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses our sample and some basics of the methodology. The cross-sectional distribution of firms' growth rates is reported in Section II. Section III presents the results of runs tests for consistency in growth of operating performance. Section IV takes up the issue of survivorship bias. Although our main focus is not on the determinants of valuation multiples, Section V examines the relation between growth and valuation ratios such as earnings yields and book-to-market ratios, on both an *ex ante* and *ex post* basis. We compare IBES long-term forecasts with realized growth rates in Section VI. Section VII uses cross-sectional regressions to forecast future growth using variables including past growth, valuation ratios, and IBES estimates. A final section concludes.

## I. Sample and Methodology

Our sample of firms comprises all domestic common stocks with data on the Compustat Active and Research files. Firms are selected at the end of each calendar year from 1951 to 1997. The earlier years are included for the sake of completeness, even though there is a backfill bias in the earlier part of the sample period (see Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995)), which may impart an upward bias to growth rates in the beginning of the sample. The number of eligible firms grows from 359 in the first sample selection year to about 6,825 in the last year; on average, the sample comprises about 2,900 firms.

We consider three indicators of operating performance: net sales (Compustat annual item number 12), operating income before depreciation (item 13), and

income before extraordinary items available for common equity (item 237). While researchers and practitioners tend to focus exclusively on income before extraordinary items, measuring growth in this variable is beset with pitfalls. In many cases, earnings before extraordinary items is negative, so prospective growth rates are undefined (for our sample, in an average year, 29 percent of firms have negative values for earnings before extraordinary items). In other cases, firms grow from low positive values of base-year net income, introducing large outliers.<sup>1</sup> These include such disparate cases as beaten-down companies with depressed earnings and growing startup companies that are beginning to generate profits. To avoid hanging all our inferences on such a noisy variable, therefore, we also consider growth in net sales and growth in operating income before depreciation. These are relatively better-behaved measures of operating performance.

Researchers have adopted different conventions for calculating growth rates. Given our focus on the predictability of growth rates, we measure growth on a per share basis so as to strip out any predictability due to changes in the scale of the firm's operations. This also corresponds to the measurement convention in the investment industry.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, we take the perspective of an investor who buys and holds one share of a stock over some horizon and track the growth in sales or income that accrues to one share, after adjusting for stock splits and dividends. Moreover, two firms can offer the same expected return, but have different earnings growth rates because of their dividend payout policies. From an investor's standpoint, these two stocks would be considered equivalent. To put firms with different dividend policies on an equal footing, therefore, all cash dividends as well as any special distributions (such as when a firm spins off assets) are reinvested in the stock.

## II. The Distribution of Growth Rates of Operating Performance

This section documents the distribution of historical growth rates over relatively long horizons (5 and 10 years). For the sake of completeness, results are also provided for 1-year horizons. At each calendar year-end over the sample period, we measure rates of growth in future operating performance for all eligible

<sup>1</sup> Some of these complications may be alleviated by averaging earnings over a number of years and measuring growth in these averages. Since our focus is on point-in-time growth rates, we do not explore this alternative procedure. In unreported work, we also experiment with other ways to calculate growth rates. These include value-weighted growth rates for portfolios, estimated growth rates from least-squares fits of linear and quadratic time trends through sales and income, and growth rates without dividend reinvestment. Generally speaking, the results are robust to how we measure growth rates.

<sup>2</sup> Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) calculate growth in a firm's overall sales and earnings, while Daniel and Titman (2001) calculate growth on a per share basis. These studies focus on the impact of investor sentiment on stock returns. The hypothesis is that investors tend to favor companies with strong past performance, those in a glamorous line of business, or those which are perceived to be well managed. From this standpoint, it might be argued that it is the performance of the overall company that is relevant, and not just the profits earned per share.

stocks. Percentiles are calculated for the distribution obtained at each year-end. Table I reports the percentiles averaged across years in the sample period, as well as the most recent distribution corresponding to the last selection year of the sample period.

Several points are important as background to the results in Table I. First, since we include reinvestment of dividends and special distributions, the growth rates we report are typically higher than conventionally measured growth rates. The median dividend yield for our sample (averaged across all years) is about 2.5 percent. A second caveat is that the tabulated growth rates are based only on firms who survive for the following 1, 5, or 10 years. The survivorship bias may induce an upward bias in our reported growth rates. Moreover, we follow the conventional approach and do not calculate growth rates for operating income before depreciation or income before extraordinary items when the base-year value is negative.<sup>3</sup> To illustrate the potential magnitude of these complications, on average there are about 2,900 firms available for inclusion in the sample at each year-end. Of these, 2,782 firms survive at the end of the next year and have a reported value for income before extraordinary items. The calculations for 1-year growth in earnings before extraordinary items are based on 1994 of these firms; the remaining 788 firms have negative values for income in the base year. At the 5-year horizon, there are on average 1884 surviving firms. Growth rates are calculated for 1,398 of these; 486 have negative base-year values. At the 10-year horizon, there are 1,265 surviving firms: 1,002 and 263 with positive and negative base-year values, respectively. In a subsequent section, we examine the performance of nonsurviving firms.

Since negative base-year values are quite common for income before extraordinary items, valid growth rates are unavailable in many cases. These observations are symptomatic of another problem. In particular, the high frequency of cases with negative base values suggests that the neighboring portion of the distribution (with low, positive base-year values) contains a large fraction of the observations as well. These instances give rise to some very high growth rates. For growth over five years, for example, the 98th percentile value for growth in income before extraordinary items averages 62.4 percent per year. Hence, while growth in income before extraordinary items captures much of the investment community's interest, its behavior is the most questionable. While the same problem applies to operating income before depreciation, the frequency of negative base-year values is comparatively lower and growth in this variable is less problematic.<sup>4</sup> For growth in this variable, the 98th percentile is 51.2 percent on average. In comparison, sales growth is relatively well behaved, with a 98th percentile value of 40.5 percent on average. These comparisons suggest that looking at

<sup>3</sup> Note, however, that even if we are unable to calculate growth in income before extraordinary items in such a case, we still get a reading on a firm's operating performance growth from sales (or operating income before depreciation if it is positive).

<sup>4</sup> For example, of the firms surviving after one year and with a reported value for income before depreciation, about 14 percent on average have negative base-year values. The corresponding percentage for income before extraordinary items is 29 percent.

other indicators beyond income before extraordinary items helps to give a more robust picture of growth in operating performance.

The results in Table I serve as cautionary flags to analysts and investors who pursue stocks with rich price–earnings multiples. Take our original example of a stock with a current price–earnings multiple of 100, which declines to 20 in 10 years' time with an expected return of 10 percent per year. Earnings must grow at 29.2 percent per year over 10 years to justify the current multiple. This is a tall order by historical standards. In particular, the required growth rate corresponds to about the 95th percentile of the distribution of 10-year growth rates, even putting aside the inclusion of dividends. Put differently, suppose earnings grow at a historically more representative, but still healthy, annual rate of 14.7 percent (the 75th percentile of the distribution from Part I). Then the current ratio of 100 would be justified if the time it takes for the multiple to fall to 20 is stretched out to 38 years.

Small firms start from a smaller scale of operations and so have more room for potential growth, possibly justifying a high current multiple. However, high multiples also apply to many large, well-known firms. To see whether large firms in general can also achieve high growth, Table II reports the distribution of growth rates for large firms (companies ranked in the top two deciles of year-end equity market capitalization, based on NYSE breakpoints). Bigger firms have a larger scale of operations and, hence, are more likely to face limits on their growth, so extremely high growth rates are less prevalent in Table II compared to Table I. For example, the 90th percentiles of growth rates over 10 years for income before extraordinary items, operating income before depreciation, and sales are all close to 16 percent per year. Also, note that dividend yields are generally higher for large firms.

Our estimated median growth rate is reasonable when compared to the overall economy's growth rate. On average over the sample period, the median growth rate over 10 years for income before extraordinary items is about 10 percent for all firms. The behavior over the last 10-year period in the sample roughly matches the overall average. Growth in the other two indicators also exhibit comparable medians. After deducting the dividend yield (the median yield is 2.5 percent), as well as inflation (which averages 4 percent per year over the sample period), the growth in real income before extraordinary items is roughly 3.5 percent per year. This is consistent with the historical growth rate in real gross domestic product, which has averaged about 3.4 percent per year over the period 1950 to 1998. It is difficult to see how the profitability of the business sector over the long term can grow much faster than overall gross domestic product.

Looking forward, if we project future growth using the median of the distribution of historical growth rates, the implication is that the expected future return on stocks is not very high. For example, in a simple dividend discount model with constant growth rates and constant payout ratio, the expected return is equal to the dividend yield plus the expected future growth rate of earnings. Given the low level of current dividend yields (below 1.5 percent) and expected inflation of 2.5 percent, the expected return is only about 7.5 percent. This is lower than the

**Table I**  
**Distribution of Growth Rates of Operating Performance over 1, 5 and 10 Years: All Firms**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one, five, and ten years for all firms in the sample. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales, operating income before depreciation, or income before extraordinary items available to common equity. Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample selection date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. Percentiles of the distribution are calculated each year-end; the simple average over the entire sample period of the percentiles is reported, along with the distribution of growth rates over horizons ending in the last year of the sample period.

Sample period	Percentile								
	2%	10%	25%	40%	50%	60%	75%	90%	98%
Part I: Annualized Growth Rate over 10 Years									
<i>(A) Sales</i>									
Average	-9.6	0.1	5.5	8.7	10.2	11.5	13.8	18.0	27.6
Ending 1998	-16.1	-3.4	2.9	6.2	7.9	9.5	12.7	19.2	32.9
<i>(B) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>									
Average	-13.3	-2.3	4.1	7.6	9.5	11.2	14.1	19.4	31.3
Ending 1998	-14.6	-3.3	3.3	7.2	9.0	10.9	14.1	21.5	38.6
<i>(C) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>									
Average	-15.6	-3.1	3.9	7.7	9.7	11.6	14.7	20.4	33.4
Ending 1998	-21.2	-6.3	2.3	6.9	9.0	11.4	15.3	24.4	48.8
Part II: Annualized Growth Rate over 5 Years									
<i>(A) Sales</i>									
Average	-18.7	-4.1	4.3	8.2	10.2	12.0	15.3	22.1	40.5
Ending 1998	-22.7	-6.2	2.9	8.0	10.2	12.4	17.1	27.6	56.3
<i>(B) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>									
Average	-26.8	-8.4	1.9	7.2	9.8	12.4	17.1	26.7	51.2
Ending 1998	-24.4	-7.8	3.5	8.7	11.5	14.4	19.9	33.4	64.4
<i>(C) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>									
Average	-30.9	-10.3	1.5	7.4	10.5	13.4	18.8	30.4	62.4
Ending 1998	-35.1	-11.5	2.8	9.1	12.4	15.7	23.1	40.1	88.2

		Part III: 1-Year Growth Rate									
Average	-47.3	1.2	7.6	10.9	14.2	21.0	38.7	121.7			
Ending 1998	-58.3	-1.4	6.3	10.3	14.5	24.9	54.1	181.9			
			<i>(A) Sales</i>								
Average	-69.4	-5.6	5.9	11.8	17.7	30.6	67.4	253.3			
Ending 1998	-74.1	-4.9	6.7	12.2	18.5	32.2	76.5	273.2			
			<i>(B) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>								
Average	-76.8	-7.4	6.9	13.3	19.9	35.8	90.2	435.3			
Ending 1998	-87.3	-13.7	5.4	13.7	21.3	40.4	115.0	727.2			
			<i>(C) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>								

**Table II**  
**Distribution of Growth Rates of Operating Performance over 1, 5 and 10**  
**Years: Large Firms**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one, five, and ten years for large firms (in the top two deciles of year-end equity market capitalization, based on NYSE breakpoints). The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales, operating income before depreciation, or income before extraordinary items available to common equity. Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. Percentiles of the distribution are calculated each year-end; the simple average over the entire sample period of the percentiles is reported, along with the distribution of growth rates over horizons ending in the last year of the sample period.

Sample period	Percentile								
	2%	10%	25%	40%	50%	60%	75%	90%	98%
Part I: Annualized Growth Rate over 10 Years									
(A) Sales									
Average	-3.4	2.5	6.8	9.4	10.7	11.7	13.3	16.3	22.0
Ending 1998	-7.7	-0.2	4.4	6.7	8.5	9.5	11.1	15.0	21.5
(B) Operating Income before Depreciation									
Average	-8.3	0.6	5.4	8.1	9.5	10.8	12.9	16.1	22.6
Ending 1998	-11.6	-1.7	4.3	7.4	8.7	10.4	11.8	16.3	21.4
(C) Income before Extraordinary Items									
Average	-12.8	-0.9	4.5	7.5	9.3	10.8	13.1	16.6	23.8
Ending 1998	-25.6	-3.8	1.7	6.1	8.2	9.9	13.3	18.5	36.4
Part II: Annualized Growth Rate over 5 Years									
(A) Sales									
Average	-9.7	-0.6	6.9	9.4	10.8	11.9	14.1	18.1	27.9
Ending 1998	-13.6	-3.0	4.0	8.8	10.2	11.5	13.7	19.6	32.5
(B) Operating Income before Depreciation									
Average	-16.9	-3.5	4.3	7.9	9.8	11.5	14.3	19.3	32.1
Ending 1998	-13.6	-6.6	4.5	7.5	10.8	12.7	15.6	19.9	32.0
(C) Income before Extraordinary Items									
Average	-26.4	-6.4	2.8	7.6	9.8	12.0	15.3	21.3	37.2
Ending 1998	-39.5	-10.1	4.3	9.5	11.8	14.4	19.6	30.4	57.4
Part III: 1-Year Growth Rate									
(A) Sales									
Average	-36.4	-2.4	5.7	9.3	11.3	13.3	17.0	25.2	47.7
Ending 1998	-49.8	-14.7	1.5	6.6	8.9	11.8	18.1	29.1	53.0
(B) Operating Income before Depreciation									
Average	-52.3	-15.2	0.2	7.1	10.6	13.8	19.8	33.7	82.3
Ending 1998	-60.0	-30.3	-1.9	6.6	11.1	14.0	20.8	33.4	73.1
(C) Income before Extraordinary Items									
Average	-67.5	-25.3	-2.8	6.9	11.0	14.9	23.1	45.9	216.6
Ending 1998	-80.0	-46.9	-13.5	4.7	11.5	15.5	27.1	56.7	213.6

consensus forecast of professional economists (see Welch (2000)), but is in line with Fama and French (2002).

### III. Persistence in Growth

Differences in valuations indicate a pervasive belief that stocks with high or low future growth are easily identifiable *ex ante*. For example, analysts and investors seem to believe that a firm that has grown rapidly in the past for several years in a row is highly likely to repeat this performance in the future. Conversely, stocks that have done poorly over prolonged periods are shunned and trade at low multiples. This section checks whether there is consistency in growth. We examine whether past growth or other characteristics, such as industry affiliation or firm size, help to predict future growth.

#### A. Consistency across All Firms

Tables I and II suggest that year-to-year growth in income can take on quite extreme values. As a result, multiyear growth rate levels may look impressive because of one or two isolated years of sharp growth, although growth in other years may be unremarkable. However, many of the firms with lofty multiples grow rapidly every year for several years. Accordingly, we test for consistency in growth using a design that does not rely heavily on the level of growth rates.<sup>5</sup> In our first set of tests, we define consistency as achieving a growth rate above the median for a consecutive number of years: Such cases are labeled as runs.<sup>6</sup>

At each year-end over the sample period, we calculate how many firms achieve runs over horizons of 1 to 10 years in the future. A run over 5 years, for example, denotes a case where in each of the subsequent 5 years, a firm's growth rate exceeds the median growth rate that year. Each year's median is calculated over all growth rate observations available in that year. Again, note that survivorship bias affects our runs tests. To see how many firms achieve runs above the median for 5 years in a row, we necessarily look at firms that survive over the full 5 years. In each of these years, we compare the survivors to a median which is based on all available firms that year, including those that do not survive for the full 5 years,

<sup>5</sup> Brealey (1983) uses a similar procedure.

<sup>6</sup> We want to avoid discarding an entire sequence of observations because one year's growth rate cannot be calculated when earnings are negative. Instead, we handle such cases as follows, taking growth in operating income per share  $OI_t$  as an example. In addition to calculating the percentage growth rate of operating income as  $(OI_{t+1} - OI_t)/OI_t$  for each firm, we also scale the change in operating income by the stock price as of the base year  $t$ ,  $(OI_{t+1} - OI_t)/P_t$ . All firms in a given year are ranked by their values of change in income relative to stock price. For any firm with negative income in a base year, we find its percentile rank based on income change relative to price. We then look up the corresponding percentile value from the distribution of growth rates of income (based on firms with positive base-year values) for that year. This growth rate is then assigned to the firm with negative base-year income. At the same time, however, it would be dangerous to pin our estimates of growth over a 5- or 10-year horizon in Tables I and II on some imputed value of base-year earnings. Accordingly, we do not impute growth rates in those tables for cases with negative base-year values.

**Table III**  
**Persistence in Growth Rates of Operating Performance: All Firms**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one to ten years (or until delisting) for all firms in the sample. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales (panel A), operating income before depreciation (panel B), or income before extraordinary items available to common equity (panel C). Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. For each of the following ten years, the number of firms with valid growth rates, the number of firms whose growth rate exceeds the median growth rate each year for the indicated number of years, the percentage these firms represent relative to the number of valid firms, and the percentage expected under the hypothesis of independence across years, are reported. Statistics are provided for the entire sample period, and for the ten-year horizon corresponding to the last sample formation year.

Variable	Firms with Above-Median Growth each year for Number of Years									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	<i>(A) Sales</i>									
Average Number of Valid Firms	2771	2500	2263	2058	1878	1722	1590	1471	1364	1265
Average Number above Median	1386	721	382	209	118	70	42	26	17	11
Percent above Median 1989–1998	50.0	28.8	16.9	10.2	6.3	4.0	2.7	1.8	1.3	0.9
	50.0	30.0	18.6	11.9	7.8	5.6	3.4	2.4	1.5	1.2
	<i>(B) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>									
Average Number of Valid Firms	2730	2456	2219	2014	1833	1678	1546	1428	1322	1223
Average Number above Median	1365	628	290	136	67	34	18	10	6	4
Percent above Median 1989–1998	50.0	25.6	13.0	6.8	3.6	2.0	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.3
	50.0	25.0	13.1	7.0	4.0	2.1	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.5
	<i>(C) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>									
Average Number of Valid Firms	2782	2509	2271	2065	1884	1727	1593	1473	1365	1265
Average Number above Median	1391	625	277	125	57	28	14	7	4	2
Percent above Median 1989–1998	50.0	24.9	12.2	6.0	3.0	1.6	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.2
Expected Percent above Median	50.0	24.8	12.2	5.7	2.6	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.0
	50.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	3.1	1.6	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.1

and newly listed firms. Since the survivors are likely to have better performance than the population, they tend to have a greater chance of being above the median. Section IV examines differences between the growth rates of surviving and nonsurviving firms.

Table III reports the counts of runs, averaged across the year-ends. For growth in sales (Panel A), for example, out of an average number of 2,900 firms available for sample selection at each year-end, 2,771 firms on average survive until the end

of the following year. Over the following 10 years, there are on average 1,265 surviving firms. Of these, 11 have sales growth rates that exceed the median in each of the 10 years, representing 0.9 percent of the eligible firms. If sales growth is independent over time, we should expect to see  $0.5^{10}$  (about 0.1 percent) of the surviving firms achieve runs above the median over 10 years (see the last row of the table). To give a flavor of what happens in the more recent years, we also report the percentage of firms with runs over the 10-year period ending in the last year of our sample period.

There is a great deal of persistence in sales growth. Over a five-year horizon, for example, on average 118 firms, or 6.3 percent of the 1878 firms who exist over the full five years, turn in runs above the median. The number expected under the hypothesis of independence over time is about 59 (3.1 percent of 1,878), so roughly twice more than expected achieve runs over five years.

The persistence in sales growth may reflect shifts in customer demand, which are likely to be fairly long-lasting. A firm can also sustain momentum in sales by expanding into new markets and opening new stores, by rolling out new or improved products, or by granting increasingly favorable credit terms. Persistence in sales may also arise from managers' "empire-building" efforts, such as expanding market share regardless of profitability. In all these cases, however, profit margins are likely to be shrinking as well, so growth in profits may not show as much persistence as sales growth.

While it may be relatively easy for a firm to generate growth in sales (by selling at a steep discount, for example), it is more difficult to generate growth in profits. The recent experience of Internet companies, where sales grew at the same time losses were accumulating, provides a stark example. Panel B confirms that there is less persistence in operating income before depreciation compared to sales. On average, 67 firms a year, or 3.6 percent of 1,833 surviving firms, have above-median runs for 5 consecutive years. The expected frequency of runs is 3.1 percent or 57 firms. There are, thus, 10 firms more than expected out of 1,833, so the difference is unremarkable. An average of 4 firms a year (or 0.3 percent of 1,223 survivors), which is only 3 more than expected, pull off above-median growth for 10 years in a row. The patterns in the more recent years do not deviate markedly from the averages across the entire sample period.

Any sign of persistence vanishes as we get closer to the bottom line (Panel C). On average, the number of firms who grow faster than the median for several years in a row is not different from what is expected by chance. An average of 57 firms out of 1,884 survivors (3 percent) beat the median for 5 years in a row, while 59 (3.1 percent) are expected to do so. Runs above the median for 10 years occur in 0.2 percent of 1,265 cases (or 2 firms), roughly matching the expected frequency (0.1 percent, or 1 firm). To sum up, analysts and investors seem to believe that many firms' earnings can consistently grow at high rates for quite a few years. The evidence suggests instead that the number of such occurrences is not much different from what might be expected from sheer luck. The lack of consistency in earnings growth agrees with the notion that in competitive markets, abnormal profits tend to be dissipated over time.

**Table IV**  
**Persistence in Growth Rates of Operating Performance: Selected Equity Classes**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one to ten years (or until delisting) for all firms in the sample. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the underlying sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales, operating income before depreciation, or income before extraordinary items available to common equity. Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of (the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. For each of the following ten years, the number of firms whose growth rate exceeds the median growth rate each year for the indicated number of years is expressed as a percentage of the number of firms with valid growth rates. Statistics are provided for the following sets of stocks: technology stocks (panel A), comprising stocks whose SIC codes begin with 283, 357, 366, 38, 48, or 737; value stocks (panel B), comprising stocks ranked in the top three deciles by book-to-market value of equity; glamour stocks (panel C), comprising an equivalent number as in panel B of the lowest-ranked stocks by book-to-market value of equity; large stocks (panel D), comprising stocks ranked in the top 2 deciles by equity market value; mid-cap stocks (panel E), comprising stocks ranked in the third through seventh deciles by equity market value; and small stocks (panel F), comprising stocks ranked in the bottom three deciles by equity market value. All decile breakpoints are based on domestic NYSE stocks only.

Variable	Percent of Firms with Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Years									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	<i>(A) Technology Stocks</i>									
Sales	51.6	30.7	19.1	12.5	8.5	5.9	4.2	3.0	2.3	1.7
Operating Income	51.0	27.2	14.9	8.7	5.3	3.3	2.2	1.4	1.0	0.7
Income before Extraordinary Items	50.9	25.9	13.5	7.3	4.1	2.5	1.5	0.9	0.5	0.4
	<i>(B) Value Stocks</i>									
Sales	50.6	30.0	18.2	11.1	6.9	4.3	2.8	1.9	1.3	0.9
Operating Income	49.3	25.3	13.2	6.8	3.5	1.8	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.2
Income before Extraordinary Items	48.3	23.8	11.4	5.4	2.5	1.2	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.2
	<i>(C) Glamour Stocks</i>									
Sales	48.3	26.6	15.1	8.5	4.7	2.7	1.7	1.0	0.8	0.6
Operating Income	50.1	25.2	11.9	5.9	3.3	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.3
Income before Extraordinary Items	50.7	25.2	12.0	5.8	2.9	1.6	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.1
	<i>(D) Large Stocks</i>									
Sales	53.2	31.3	18.9	11.7	7.5	4.8	3.2	2.2	1.6	1.1
Operating Income	49.4	25.2	13.0	6.9	3.7	2.0	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.3
Income before Extraordinary Items	46.7	21.9	10.0	4.7	2.2	1.2	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.2
	<i>(E) Mid-cap Stocks</i>									
Sales	53.9	32.4	19.8	12.1	7.6	4.9	3.3	2.2	1.5	1.0
Operating Income	50.5	26.6	13.9	7.5	4.2	2.4	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.4
Income before Extraordinary Items	49.4	24.9	12.4	6.2	3.1	1.6	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.2
	<i>(F) Small Stocks</i>									
Sales	47.0	26.1	14.7	8.6	5.2	3.2	2.1	1.4	1.0	0.7
Operating Income	50.1	25.2	12.6	6.4	3.3	1.8	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.2
Income before Extraordinary Items	51.0	25.5	12.6	6.3	3.2	1.7	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.1
Expected Percent above Median	50.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	3.1	1.6	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.1

*B. Consistency for Subsets of Firms*

While Table III suggests that there may not be much consistency in growth across all firms, it is possible that consistency may show up more strongly in subsets of firms. Table IV focuses our tests by looking at the performance of subsamples of firms. For a subsample such as small stocks, we consider a “run” as a case where the firm’s growth rate exceeds the median for a consecutive number of years, where each year the median is calculated across all firms in the entire sample, not just small stocks. This explains why the percentage of runs is not identically 50 percent in the first year.

Many observers single out technology and pharmaceutical firms as instances of consistently high growth over long horizons. Such firms may be able to maintain high growth rates because of their intangible assets, such as specialized technological innovations or drug patents. Panel A examines firms in these sectors. Specifically, the sample comprises firms that are relatively heavily engaged in research and development activity, and are predominantly drawn from the computer equipment, software, electrical equipment, communications, and pharmaceutical industries.<sup>7</sup> Growth in sales and operating income for the set of technology firms both display strong persistence. However, the percentage of runs in income before extraordinary items does not differ markedly from the expected frequency. For example, over a five-year horizon, 14 firms (or 4.1 percent of the 331 surviving technology stocks) have above-median runs. This is only 4 more than the expected number of runs (10 firms, or 3.1 percent). The recent experience of Internet companies provides numerous examples where sales grow rapidly for several years, at the same time that losses are mounting.

Panel A may exaggerate the degree of persistence in growth for technology stocks on two accounts. First, the technology stocks are evaluated against the median growth rate of the entire sample of firms, which would include, for example, utility stocks with relatively unexciting growth rates. Second, technology stocks are relatively more volatile, so survivorship bias may be a particularly acute problem in this subsample.

Technology stocks that are intensive in research and development also tend to be glamour stocks with low ratios of book-to-market value of equity. The popular sentiment regarding persistence in growth applies to glamour stocks generally. These stocks typically enjoy higher past growth in operating performance than value stocks with high book-to-market ratios (see Lakonishok et al. (1994)). The evidence from psychology suggests that individuals tend to use simple heuristics in decision making. As LaPorta et al. (1997) argue, investors may think that there is more consistency in growth than actually exists, so they extrapolate glamour stocks’ past good fortunes (and value stocks’ past disappointments) too far into the future. Panels B and C of Table IV test for consistency in growth for value and glamour stocks, respectively. Value stocks comprise stocks that are ranked

<sup>7</sup> Specifically, the sample includes all firms whose SIC codes begin with 283, 357, 366, 38, 48, or 737. See Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001).

in the top three deciles by book-to-market ratio based on NYSE breakpoints, while glamour stocks represent an equivalent number of stocks with the lowest positive book-to-market ratios. Growth in sales is persistent for both sets of stocks. The results for the other measures of operating performance, however, are not markedly different across the two sets of stocks.

The remaining panels perform our runs tests for large, midcapitalization, and small stocks. Large stocks include stocks in the top two deciles of market capitalization based on NYSE breakpoints as of June in the sample selection year, midcapitalization stocks fall in the next five deciles, and small stocks include the bottom three deciles. While sales growth tends to be more persistent for large firms, it does not translate into persistent growth in income. Of the large stocks, 2.2 percent achieve five-year runs in growth of income before extraordinary items, while 3.2 percent of small stocks achieve the same result (the expected fraction is 3.1 percent).

### *C. Runs Tests Conditional on Past Growth*

It might be expected that firms that have demonstrated consistently superior past growth would be able to maintain their growth in the future. In the case of firms such as Microsoft and EMC, their valuations at year-end 1999 reflected investors' bets that these firms will beat the odds and continue the streak. Table V checks whether firms that have demonstrated consistently high (or low) past growth have continued success in the future.

Part I of Table V applies runs tests to those firms that have achieved superior past growth. In Panel A, at every year-end, we select those firms with above-median growth in each of the prior five years (or three years), and examine their subsequent growth.

Superior past growth in sales carries over into the future. In Panel A1, out of all firms whose sales grow above the median rate each year over the prior three years, on average 305 firms survive over the three years following sample selection. Of these, 70 firms have above-median growth rates in each of the three post-selection years. They represent 22.8 percent of the survivors, compared to the 12.5 percent that is expected by chance. Growth in income, on the other hand, is an entirely different matter (Panels A2 and A3). For example, there are 222 firms with the impressive track record of above-median growth in income before extraordinary items in each of the three prior years and that survive over the following three years. Yet over the postselection period, only 28 or 12.5 percent manage to repeat and beat the median over all available firms each year. This matches the number expected under the null hypothesis of independence. Although sample sizes become much smaller in the case of firms with favorable growth over the past five years, the findings are similar. Starting out with roughly 2,900 eligible firms on average, 43 firms enjoy a run over the preceding five years for growth in income before extraordinary items and survive over the subsequent five years. In these five years, the percentage of firms who manage to repeat the run is 5.1 percent, while the percentage expected by chance is 3.1 percent. This corresponds to only one run more than expected, however, so the difference is not outstanding.

**Table V**  
**Persistence in Growth Rates of Operating Performance: Firms with Superior and Poor Past Growth**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one to five years (or until delisting) for firms with superior (part I of the table) or inferior (part II) past-growth in operating performance. Firms with superior (inferior) past growth include: firms with above-median (below-median) operating performance growth each year over the past five or past three years; firms whose average rank on growth rate each year over the past five or past three years falls in the top (bottom) quartile. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and eligible firms include all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales (panel 1), operating income before depreciation (panel 2), or income before extraordinary items available to common equity (panel 3). Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. For each of the following five years, the number of firms with valid growth rates, the number of firms whose growth rate exceeds the median growth rate each year for the indicated number of years, the percentage these firms represent relative to the number of valid firms, and the percentage expected under the hypothesis of independence across years are reported.

	Part I: Firms with Superior Past Growth									
	(A) Firms with Past Above-Median Run					Firms with Above-Median Growth each Year for Past 5 Years and Above-Median Growth each Year for Past 3 Years and Above-Median Growth each Year for 3 Years and Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Future Years:				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Average Number of Valid Firms	110	103	96	90	83	<i>(A1) Sales</i>				
Average Number above Median	70	42	26	17	11	355	329	305	285	265
Percent above Median	63.3	41.0	27.3	19.0	13.7	209	118	70	42	26
Average Number of Valid Firms	61	57	53	50	47	<i>(A2) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>				
Average Number above Median	34	18	10	6	4	58.9	35.6	22.8	14.8	9.9
Percent above Median	55.9	32.3	19.4	12.2	8.0	267	245	227	210	194
Average Number of Valid Firms	53	50	47	44	43	<i>(A3) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>				
Average Number above Median	28	14	7	4	2	259	240	222	207	193
Percent above Median	51.9	27.8	15.1	8.4	5.1	125	57	28	14	7
Expected Percent above Median	50.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	3.1	48.3	23.7	12.5	6.7	3.6
						50.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	3.1

Table V—continued

(B) Firms with Past Average Growth Rank in Top Quartile										
	Firms with Average Growth Rank over Past 5 Years in Top Quartile and Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Future Years					Firms with Average Growth Rank over Past 3 Years in Top Quartile and Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Future Years				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Average Number of Valid Firms	78	71	66	61	56	204	187	172	159	147
Average Number above Median	47	27	16	10	6	120	67	39	24	15
Percent above Median	60.8	37.7	24.4	16.6	11.4	58.9	35.8	22.8	14.8	9.9
	<i>(B2) Operating Income before Depreciation</i>									
Average Number of Valid Firms	35	32	30	27	25	133	121	110	100	91
Average Number above Median	18	8	4	2	1	65	31	15	8	4
Percent above Median	50.6	26.4	15.0	8.9	5.9	49.0	25.4	13.6	7.6	4.7
	<i>(B3) Income before Extraordinary Items</i>									
Average Number of Valid Firms	29	27	25	23	22	121	112	103	94	86
Average Number above Median	13	5	3	1	0	56	24	11	5	2
Percent above Median	44.0	19.6	10.2	4.8	2.1	46.4	21.5	10.4	5.5	2.6
Part II. Firms with Inferior Past Growth										
(C) Firms with Past Below-Median Run										
	Firms with Below Median Growth each Year for Past 5 Years and Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Future Years:					Firms with Below Median Growth each Year for Past 3 Years and Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Future Years:				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Average Number of Valid Firms	106	92	82	73	66	343	302	270	244	221
Average Number above Median	35	15	7	4	2	125	59	28	14	7
Percent above Median	33.0	16.3	8.6	4.9	2.5	36.4	19.4	10.6	5.9	3.4



The results caution against extrapolating past success in income growth into the future.

A firm may have extraordinary past growth even though it slips below the median for one or two years, as long as growth in the other years is very high. To include such cases of successful past growth, we use a different criterion for what qualifies as superior past growth. In particular, we also classify firms by their average growth ranks. At every calendar year-end over the sample period, we assign each firm a score based on its past growth. The score is obtained by looking back over each of the preceding five (or three) years, ranking the firm's growth rate each year relative to all available firms (where the firms with the highest growth rate and the lowest growth rate get ranks of one and zero, respectively), and then averaging the ranks over five (or three) years. Firms whose average ranks fall in the top quartile are classified as firms with superior past growth in Panel B. While high past sales growth foretells high future sales growth, there are still no signs of persistence in growth of income before extraordinary items in Panel B3. Out of the firms who survive for three years following sample selection, 103 firms have an average rank based on growth over the preceding three years falling in the top quartile. Only 11 or 10.4 percent of them have above-median runs in the three postselection years, amounting to 2 less than the expected number.

In Part II of Table V, Panel C performs the same analysis for firms with below-median growth over each of the past five or past three years. However, survivorship bias is a particularly grave concern here. After a long period of lackluster performance, the firms that are left standing at the end of the following period are particularly likely to be those who post relatively high growth rates. From Panel C1, future sales growth is persistently low. The fraction of above-median runs in sales growth is notably lower than the expected percentage. On the other hand, they are not less likely to achieve favorable above-median runs with regard to future growth in income. For example, looking at firms with a below-median run for the past three years, over the following three- and five-year horizons, the actual (expected) proportions of above-median runs are 15.3 (12.5) and 3.4 (3.1) percent for growth in income before extraordinary items. While survivorship bias makes it difficult to draw a definitive conclusion, it does not appear that, going forward, the firms with disappointing past growth differ notably from the more successful firms with respect to growth in income.

#### *D. Alternative Criteria for Consistency in Growth*

Given the large transitory component of earnings, investors may consider a firm to show persistent growth even if its growth fades for a few years, as long as there is rapid growth for the rest of the time. Even a celebrated example of a growth stock such as Microsoft, for example, falls short of delivering above-median growth in income before extraordinary items for 10 years in a row.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> In the 10-year period preceding the latest sample selection date, Microsoft's growth rank of 0.49 in 1994 narrowly misses the median that year.

In Table VI, we adopt more relaxed criteria for defining consistency in growth. In particular, we check whether a firm beats the median for most years over the horizon, but allow it to fall short of the median for one or two years. For example, looking forward from a sample selection date, 269 firms on average have sales growth rates that exceed the median in five out of the following six years. These firms represent 15.6 percent of the surviving firms, more than the expected value of 9.4 percent. In the case of income before extraordinary items, the departures from what is expected under independence are slender, especially over longer horizons. For instance, an average of 9.9 percent have income before extraordinary items growing at a rate above the median for five out of six years, which is close to the expectation of 9.4 percent. Similarly, if we let a firm falter for two years, 4.8 percent of the surviving firms have growth in income before extraordinary items that exceeds the median in 8 out of 10 years, compared to an expected value of 4.4 percent.

As another way to single out cases of sustained high growth while allowing for some slack, we require a firm to post an average annual growth rank over the subsequent five years that falls in the top quartile (where in any year a growth rank of one denotes the highest realized growth rate that year, and zero denotes the lowest rate). The results for this definition of consistency are provided in the last column of Table VI. On average, 1.4 percent of the surviving firms (27 firms) pass this criterion with respect to growth of income before extraordinary items. Assuming independence, the expected value is 2.5 percent.

In summary, analysts' forecasts as well as investors' valuations reflect a widespread belief in the investment community that many firms can achieve streaks of high growth in earnings. Perhaps this belief is akin to the notion that there are "hot hands" in basketball or mutual funds (see Camerer (1989) and Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993)). While there is persistence in sales growth, there is no evidence of persistence in terms of growth in the bottom line as reflected by operating income before depreciation and income before extraordinary items. Instead, the number of firms delivering sustained high growth in profits is not much different from what is expected by chance. The results for subsets of firms, and under a variety of definitions of what constitutes consistently superior growth, deliver the same verdict. Put more bluntly, the chances of being able to identify the next Microsoft are about the same as the odds of winning the lottery. This finding is what would be expected from economic theory: Competitive pressures ultimately dissipate excess earnings, so profitability growth reverts to a normal rate.

#### **IV. The Behavior of Nonsurvivors**

Survivorship bias is a serious concern in our tests. By necessity, we condition on surviving into the future in order to calculate growth rates and to carry out our runs tests. Moreover, in our runs tests, the survivors are compared each year to all firms (survivors and nonsurvivors) available that year. To gauge the poten-

Table VI  
**Distribution of Firms Classified by Above-Median Growth in Operating Performance over Indicated Horizon: All Firms**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following one to ten years (or until delisting) for all firms in the sample. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Operating performance is measured as sales (panel A), operating income before depreciation (panel B), or income before extraordinary items available to common equity (panel C). Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. The table reports the average number of firms with above-median growth in each of the indicated categories, as well as the percentage these firms represent relative to the number of valid firms; the last row reports the percentage expected under the hypothesis of independence across years. Statistics are provided for the entire sample period and for the ten-year horizon corresponding to the last sample formation year.

Variable	Firms with Above-Median Growth										Firms with Average Growth Rank in Top Quartile over 5 Years
	3 out of 4 years	4 out of 5 years	5 out of 6 years	6 out of 7 years	6 out of 8 years	7 out of 9 years	8 out of 10 years				
Average Number	697	432	269	170	287	191	127				79
Percent	33.9	23.0	15.6	10.7	19.5	14.0	10.0				4.2
1989-1998	36.6	26.0	18.0	12.6	21.4	16.0	12.7				5.6
Average Number	629	341	184	100	205	119	70				34
Percent	31.2	18.6	10.9	6.5	14.4	9.0	5.7				1.9
1989-1998	31.7	19.3	11.5	7.4	15.1	10.4	8.0				2.0
Average Number	634	334	171	88	190	109	61				27
Percent	30.7	17.7	9.9	5.5	12.9	8.0	4.8				1.4
1989-1998	29.9	16.5	8.4	5.0	12.8	8.4	5.7				0.9
Expected Percent	25.0	15.6	9.4	5.5	10.9	7.0	4.4				2.5

(A) Sales

(B) Operating Income before Depreciation

(C) Income before Extraordinary Items

tial magnitude of the problem, in this section, we replicate some of our tests on firms who do not survive over the entire future horizon.

Specifically, we examine two sets of stocks. Given our focus on long-horizon growth, we first select at each year-end a sample of firms who survive over the full 10-year following period. The behavior of these (the survivors) is compared to a second set (the nonsurvivors) that also includes firms who do not last for the full period. To strike a balance between the mix of survivors and nonsurvivors in this second set, we require firms to survive for the first five years after sample selection, but they may drop out between the 6th to 10th year of the postselection period.

The results are reported in Panels A and B of Table VII. The survivors have a higher chance than expected for achieving runs above the median in growth of income before extraordinary items. Conversely, the fraction of runs is lower for the set of nonsurvivors. Of the survivors, for example, 3.4 percent sustain runs for five years of growth in income before extraordinary items above the median (where the expected proportion is 3.1 percent). The corresponding percentage for nonsurvivors is 2.3 percent. Nonetheless, the differences across the two sets are generally not substantial. Panels C and D apply the same procedure to the technology stocks considered in Table IV. Here the differences across the two sets are more notable. At the five-year horizon, for example, 5.2 percent of the survivors achieve runs above the median for growth in income before extraordinary items, compared to 3.2 percent of the nonsurvivors.

Finally, Panels A and B of Part II of Table VII give the distribution of one-year growth rates for the two sets of firms (where the percentiles are averaged across all sample selection years). The results confirm that survivors realize higher growth rates than nonsurvivors. For example, the median growth in income before extraordinary items for the survivors averages 10.6 percent, compared to 8.2 percent for nonsurvivors.

## V. The Predictability of Growth: Valuation Ratios

Based on the historical record, it is not out of the question for a firm to enjoy strong growth in excess of 20 percent a year for prolonged periods. The issue, however, is whether such firms are identifiable *ex ante*. Our attempts in the previous sections to uncover cases of persistently high future growth using information such as past growth, industry affiliation, value-glamour orientation, and firm size have limited success. In this section, we expand our search for predictability by investigating whether valuation indicators such as earnings-to-price, book-to-market, and sales-to-price ratios distinguish between firms with high or low future growth. Further, several studies suggest that investors are prone to judgmental biases, so they respond to past growth by extrapolating performance too far into the future (see, e.g., La Porta (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997)). Consequently, after a period of above- or below-average growth, the valuations of firms with high (low) realized growth may be pushed too high (or too low).

In Table VIII, stocks are sorted into deciles at each year-end on the basis of their growth rate in income before extraordinary items over the following five years (Panel A) or over the following 10 years (Panel B). Within each decile, we

**Table VII**  
**Results for Surviving versus Non-Surviving Firms: Persistence Tests and Growth Rates**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, two sets of firms are selected: firms that survive over the following ten years (survivors), and firms that survive over the following five years but thereafter fail to survive until the tenth year (nonsurvivors). For each set of firms, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the following ten years. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files are eligible. Operating performance is measured as sales, operating income before depreciation, or income before extraordinary items available to common equity. Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. Part I provides runs tests of persistence over each of the following ten years for the two sets of firms: the average number of firms whose growth rate exceeds the median growth rate each year for the indicated number of years is expressed as a percentage of the number of firms with valid growth rates. Part II reports the distribution of annualized growth rates realized over the sixth to tenth year (or until delisting) following sample selection for the two sets of firms. The simple average over the entire sample period of the percentiles is reported.

Part I: Runs Tests for Persistence										
Variable	Percent of Firms with Above-Median Growth each Year for Number of Years:									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	<i>(A) Survivors (1265 firms)</i>									
Sales	52.8	30.9	18.1	10.8	6.6	4.2	2.7	1.8	1.3	0.9
Operating Income before Depreciation	51.5	26.8	13.7	7.0	3.8	2.1	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.3
Income before Extraordinary Items	51.7	26.9	13.5	6.7	3.4	1.8	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.2
	<i>(B) Non-Survivors</i>									
Number of Firms	445	445	445	445	445	344	250	165	86	0
Sales	48.7	26.6	14.6	8.1	4.5	2.8	1.7	1.1	0.8	—
Operating Income before Depreciation	50.0	24.2	11.5	5.5	2.5	1.3	0.7	0.5	0.3	—
Income before Extraordinary Items	49.1	23.8	11.1	5.1	2.3	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.1	—
	<i>(C) Survivors, Technology (195 firms)</i>									
Sales	54.6	33.2	20.5	12.9	8.4	5.8	4.2	3.0	2.3	1.7
Operating Income before Depreciation	53.6	29.7	16.5	9.6	5.9	3.6	2.2	1.4	1.0	0.7
Income before Extraordinary Items	54.1	29.9	16.3	9.0	5.2	3.1	1.9	1.1	0.6	0.4



**Table VIII**  
**Valuation Ratios and Characteristics at Beginning and End of Horizon for Firms Classified by Growth in Income before Extraordinary Items**

At every calendar year-end over the sample period, growth rates in income before extraordinary items available to common equity are calculated over the following five and ten years for all firms in the sample. The sample period is 1951 to 1998, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files. Growth rates are measured on a per share basis as of the sample selection date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends; cash dividends and special distributions are also reinvested. Firms are classified into one of ten equally-sized categories based on their realized five- and ten-year growth rates. The following statistics are calculated for firms within each category: the median realized annual growth rate over the horizon; the average size decile rank at the beginning and end of the growth horizon; median valuation ratios at the beginning and at the end of the horizon. The ratios are the prior year's income before extraordinary items to price (*EP*), net sales to price (*SP*), and book value to market value of common equity (*BM*). Results are averaged over all years in the sample period, and are also reported for the last five- or 10-year period. Panel A of the table provides results for firms classified by growth rates over five years and for firms with above-median growth each year for five consecutive years; Panel B provides results for firms classified by ten-year growth rates.

Variable	Decile										5-year run above median
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Median Growth Rate	- 18.9	- 5.0	1.5	5.8	9.1	12.0	15.1	18.9	25.1	41.7	40.9
Beginning Size Decile Rank	4.118	4.773	5.087	5.423	5.447	5.526	5.338	4.989	4.273	3.272	3.699
Ending Size Decile Rank	3.526	4.414	4.831	5.275	5.452	5.668	5.652	5.482	5.056	4.243	5.163
Beginning Median EP Ratio	0.083	0.085	0.086	0.083	0.084	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.079	0.068	0.061
At Start of Last 5-year Period	0.050	0.056	0.059	0.055	0.060	0.055	0.052	0.047	0.037	0.021	0.033
Ending Median EP Ratio	0.055	0.073	0.078	0.080	0.082	0.081	0.080	0.079	0.077	0.075	0.066
At End of Last 5-year Period	0.033	0.047	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.052	0.049	0.050	0.046	0.042	0.040
Beginning Median BM Ratio	0.650	0.654	0.678	0.665	0.685	0.679	0.694	0.726	0.777	0.880	0.694
At Start of Last 5-year Period	0.465	0.485	0.476	0.465	0.494	0.430	0.458	0.437	0.452	0.537	0.446
Ending Median BM Ratio	1.115	0.927	0.845	0.789	0.755	0.700	0.669	0.610	0.574	0.560	0.369
At End of Last 5-year Period	0.549	0.495	0.501	0.461	0.402	0.367	0.350	0.337	0.291	0.292	0.200
Beginning Median SP Ratio	1.723	1.576	1.473	1.304	1.370	1.276	1.328	1.530	1.791	2.323	1.684
At Start of Last 5-year Period	0.962	1.022	1.079	0.825	0.890	0.807	0.822	1.065	1.052	1.423	0.914
Ending Median SP Ratio	2.606	2.062	1.783	1.501	1.422	1.288	1.274	1.305	1.377	1.503	1.012
At End of Last 5-year Period	1.174	0.860	0.972	0.638	0.653	0.587	0.573	0.649	0.563	0.681	0.460

Panel A: Classified by Annualized Growth Rate over 5 Years



calculate the median realized growth rate, as well as median characteristics such as size decile rank and valuation ratios. This is done at the beginning of the 5- or 10-year growth horizon and also at the end of the horizon. We report results averaged across all sample selection years, as well as results for the most recent 5-year or 10-year growth horizon in our sample period.

We focus the discussion on Panel A of the table (the results are similar for the 10-year horizon). In line with the results from Tables I and II, the stocks in the extreme growth deciles tend to be smaller firms. The median firm in the top decile (with a growth rate of 41.7 percent a year) falls in the third size decile, while the median firm in the bottom decile (with a growth rate of  $-18.9$  percent) ranks in the fourth size decile. Over the following 5 years, however, the high-growth firms perform relatively well, resulting in a surge in their market values. Conversely, the market values of the low-growth firms show a relative slump.

Sorting by realized future growth induces a mechanical association between growth rates and the level of earnings at the beginning and end of the growth horizon. To weaken this link, we measure earnings one year prior to the base year (or one year before the final year) of the growth horizon. The price is measured at the start or end of the horizon, so the numbers correspond to the conventional measure of trailing earnings yield that is widely used in practice and research. There is reason to be wary about relying too heavily on the earnings yield variable, however, because net income is the most problematic of our measures of operating performance. For example, a firm may have a low earnings yield because its price impounds investors' expectations of high growth in future earnings, but another reason may be its recent performance has been poor and its earnings are currently depressed. On this account, earnings-to-price ratios are not generally used in academic research, or investment industry analysis, to classify firms as "value" or "glamour" stocks. Instead other, better-behaved, indicators such as the book-to-market ratio, are favored.

The top decile of growth firms at the beginning of the growth horizon has a median earnings-price ratio (0.068) that is much lower than the others (which cluster around 0.08). The low earnings yield for this group is consistent with the notion that the market's valuation accurately incorporates future growth. On the other hand, decile portfolios 8 and 9, which also show relatively strong growth, do not have notably low earnings yields. Rather, the association for the highest-growth decile may reflect cases where firms grow from a depressed level of income. At the end of the growth horizon, only the earnings-price ratio of the bottom decile of firms is eye-catching. Contrary to intuition, however, these firms have comparatively low earnings yields so they appear to be relatively "expensive." Instead, the explanation here may also lie in their low earnings levels, since they have gone through a period of disappointing growth.

Given the shortcomings of the earnings yield variable, we also look at valuation measures that tend to be better-behaved. Table VIII provides median ratios of book-to-market and sales-to-price at the beginning and end of the growth horizon for each decile. Firms which are ranked in the highest decile by earnings growth have relatively high sales-to-price and book-to-market ratios at the beginning. For example, their median book-to-market ratio is 0.880 (compared to 0.690

averaged across the other groups) and the median sales-to-price multiple is 2.323 (compared to 1.486 for the other groups). The modest *ex ante* valuations suggest that the market fails to anticipate their subsequent growth.

On the other hand, *ex post* valuations closely track prior growth. The top decile of high-growth firms have ending book-to-market and sales-to-price ratios of 0.560 and 1.503, respectively. These are substantially lower than the averages across all the other groups. This finding fits in with earlier evidence on the existence of extrapolative biases in investors' expectations about future growth (see La Porta (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997)).

The last column in Panel A of Table VIII provides corresponding statistics for firms whose income before extraordinary items grows above the median rate for five consecutive years. The difference between these firms' valuation ratios at the beginning and end of the growth horizon is striking. At the beginning, their book-to-market and sales-to-price ratios are not too far out of line from the average, suggesting that their future performance is not foreseen by the market. However, at the end of the growth horizon, the median book-to-market and sales-to-price ratios of this group are the lowest in Table VIII. The rich ending multiples such firms command highlight the importance investors attach to consistently superior growth, and not just high growth *per se*. Investors handsomely reward firms that have achieved several consecutive years of strong growth, and believe they will continue the streak (counterfactually, as the results in Table V indicate).

In summary, the results suggest that market valuation ratios have little ability to sort out firms with high future growth from firms with low growth. Instead, in line with the extrapolative expectations hypothesis, investors tend to key on past growth. Firms that have achieved high growth in the past fetch high valuations, while firms with low past growth are penalized with poor valuations.

## **VI. Comparisons with IBES Consensus Forecasts**

Security analysts' estimates of near-term earnings are widely disseminated and receive much attention. Dramatic movements in a stock's price can arise when an influential analyst issues a revised earnings estimate. Possibly, therefore, analysts' estimates of long-term earnings growth may also be useful in forecasting future growth over longer horizons. Analysts are not shy about making aggressive growth forecasts either (the dispersion between the top and bottom decile of IBES long-term forecasts is about 31 percent), so they apparently are confident in their own ability to pick the future success stories.

The current dividend yield on a stock may also have predictive power for future growth in earnings per share. Standard textbook analysis suggests that, given a firm's investment policy and ignoring tax effects, it is a matter of indifference to a shareholder whether earnings are paid out as current dividends or retained for growth in future dividends. For example, a firm may choose to raise the amount paid out from earnings as dividends to current shareholders. To maintain investment, however, it must use external financing, thereby diluting current shareholders' claims to future profits. In other words, high current dividends come at the expense of low future growth per share. To use a simple constant-growth

dividend discount model as an illustration, given investors' required rate of return, there is a one-to-one trade-off between future growth per share and the dividend yield. Furthermore, a firm's dividend payout may signal whether it has attractive investment projects available to fuel future growth.

To allow a cleaner comparison with analysts' forecasts, which do not include dividends, in the remainder of the paper, we drop our convention of reinvesting dividends when we calculate growth rates. Analysts' predictions refer to growth in income before extraordinary items, but realized growth in this variable is highly prone to measurement problems (such as the exclusion of cases with negative base-year values for income). For this reason, we also report realized growth in sales and operating income before depreciation. Growth rates in these variables are correlated with growth in income before extraordinary items, but are better behaved and are available for a much larger fraction of the sample.

### *A. Individual Firm Growth Rates*

Table IX relates IBES consensus long-term growth forecasts to realized future growth. At each year-end, we rank all domestic firms with available IBES long-term forecasts and sort them into quintiles. IBES long-term estimates do not become available until 1982, so the sample period in Table IX runs from 1982 to 1998. The breakpoints for the sort use all NYSE firms available as of the sample selection date (regardless of whether they survive in the future). In Table IX, we track the subsequent growth rates of firms who survive over the next one, three, or five years in each quintile. The median realized growth rate over firms in each quintile is then averaged across all sample selection dates.

The dispersion in IBES consensus growth forecasts is large, so analysts are boldly distinguishing between firms with high and low growth prospects. The median estimate in quintile 1 averages 6 percent, while the median estimate in quintile 5 is 22.4 percent on average.<sup>9</sup> Notably, analysts' estimates are quite optimistic. Over the period 1982 to 1998, the median of the distribution of IBES growth forecasts is about 14.5 percent, a far cry from the median realized five-year growth rate of about 9 percent for income before extraordinary items.<sup>10</sup>

Near-term realized growth tends to line up closely with the IBES estimate (Panel A). In the first postranking year, the median growth rate in income before extraordinary items is 18.3 percent on average for quintile 5, and 5.1 percent on average for quintile 1. The difference between the growth rates for the other quintile portfolios is much milder, however. Comparing quintiles 4 and 2, median growth rates in income before extraordinary items are apart by only 2.5 percent.

A naive model for predicting future growth uses the dividend yield, and is based on the trade-off between current dividends and future growth. Suppose,

<sup>9</sup>Note that since the breakpoints are based on NYSE stocks only, the number of stocks differs across the quintiles. In particular, many firms penetrate the top quintile.

<sup>10</sup>To sharpen the point, note that the median realized growth rate of nine percent (without dividends reinvested) is based on all firms, including smaller firms that tend to be associated with somewhat higher growth rates. IBES forecasts, on the other hand, predominantly cover larger firms.

**Table IX**  
**Realized Median Growth Rates of Operating Performance for Stocks**  
**Classified by IBES Long-Term Growth Forecasts**

At every calendar year-end  $t$  over the sample period, stocks are ranked and classified to one of five groups based on IBES forecasts of long-term earnings growth. Results are reported for individual stocks and for portfolios. For individual stocks, growth rates in operating performance are calculated over each of the five subsequent years (years  $t+1$  to  $t+5$ ) for all firms in the sample with available data. The sample period is 1982 to 1998, and all domestic firms listed on the New York, American, and Nasdaq markets with data on the Compustat files are eligible. Operating performance is measured as sales, operating income before depreciation, or income before extraordinary items available to common equity. Growth in each variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends. The median realized growth over all stocks in each classification is calculated each year, and the simple average over the entire sample period is reported. For portfolios, a value-weighted portfolio is formed at each year-end from all the stocks in each quintile sorted by IBES forecasts. The portfolio's income before extraordinary items is calculated over each of the subsequent five years, with the proceeds from liquidating delisted stocks reinvested in the surviving stocks. Growth rates for each portfolio are calculated in each formation year, and the simple average over the entire sample period of the growth rates is reported. Also reported are the ratios of the prior year's income before extraordinary items per share to current price, and the prior year's cumulative regular dividends per share to current price.

Growth in:	Quintile Based on IBES Forecast:				
	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5 (High)
<i>(A) Growth Rate in Year <math>t+1</math></i>					
Sales	1.4	4.5	6.3	8.3	13.7
Operating Income before Depreciation	3.6	6.8	7.6	10.3	16.0
Income before Extraordinary Items	5.1	9.5	10.1	12.0	18.3
Portfolio Income before Extraordinary Items	12.6	4.2	4.5	7.2	13.6
No. with Positive Base & Survive 1 year	242	256	266	318	584
No. with Negative Base & Survive 1 year	71	78	60	88	265
<i>(B) Growth Rate in Year <math>t+2</math></i>					
Sales	1.7	4.5	6.4	7.8	11.6
Operating Income before Depreciation	3.2	7.0	8.4	9.9	14.0
Income before Extraordinary Items	4.7	9.9	10.5	12.2	16.4
Portfolio Income before Extraordinary Items	6.9	7.5	6.1	9.1	10.6
No. with Positive Base & Survive 2 years	225	235	244	296	497
No. with Negative Base & Survive 2 years	62	75	59	85	252
<i>(C) Annualized Growth Rate over 3 Years</i>					
Sales	1.1	4.0	5.6	7.3	11.3
Operating Income before Depreciation	2.5	5.2	6.8	8.1	10.9
Income before Extraordinary Items	3.1	7.4	7.0	9.0	11.5
Portfolio Income before Extraordinary Items	9.0	7.3	5.2	7.1	11.4
No. with Positive Base & Survive 3 years	202	209	230	263	439
No. with Negative Base & Survive 3 years	67	70	56	82	217
<i>(D) Annualized Growth Rate over 5 Years</i>					
Sales	1.2	3.4	5.1	6.9	9.9
Operating Income before Depreciation	2.2	5.1	6.8	7.3	9.2
Income before Extraordinary Items	2.0	6.5	6.5	8.0	9.5
Portfolio Income before Extraordinary Items	8.0	10.7	7.2	7.7	11.3
No. with Positive Base & Survive 5 years	182	179	201	233	356
No. with Negative Base & Survive 5 years	57	63	50	68	170
Median IBES Forecast	6.0	10.2	12.3	15.1	22.4
Median Stock Dividend Yield, %	6.0	3.4	2.7	1.5	0.1
Portfolio Dividend Yield, %	6.9	4.6	3.3	2.5	1.3
Median Stock Earnings to Price Ratio, %	10.0	8.9	7.9	7.2	5.6

as a first approximation, that all stocks have the same long-term expected return. Given this, the naive model forecasts a spread in future growth across stocks that is identical to the spread in their current dividend yields (but in the opposite direction). The naive forecast is quite successful at picking up differences in growth across the intermediate quintiles. Over the first postranking year, the difference between the dividend yields of quintiles 2 and 4 (3.4 and 1.5 percent, respectively) corresponds roughly to the difference in their growth rates. Once differences in the dividend yield are taken into account, then, IBES estimates have forecast power for realized growth over the first year only at the extremes.

In general, IBES long-term forecasts refer to a three- to five-year horizon, so the behavior of realized growth over these horizons is more interesting. Median realized growth rates over three years and over five years are reported in Panels C and D. These panels highlight the upward bias in analysts' long-term growth estimates. In every quintile, median forecasts exceed median realized growth rates, with the most pronounced bias in quintile 5. For five-year growth in income before extraordinary items, for example, the median forecast in the top quintile is 22.4 percent, much higher than the median realized growth rate, which is only 9.5 percent. Furthermore, the realized growth rate for the firms in the top quintile should be taken with a grain of salt. In the highest-ranked quintile, the percentage of firms who survive for the full five postranking years is lower than for any of the other quintiles. For example, there are 849 firms on average who survive in the first postranking year in quintile 5, but this drops to 526 by the fifth year, so about 38 percent of the firms drop out between the first and fifth years. For quintile 3, the corresponding counts are 326 and 251, respectively, so 23 percent disappear from the sample. The upshot is that realized growth in income before extraordinary items is likely to be somewhat overstated for firms in the top quintile.

Over longer horizons, analysts' growth estimates still do not add much information beyond what is contained in the dividend yield. For example, the median realized five-year growth rate is 9.5 percent for the highest-ranked quintile by IBES forecasts, compared to 2 percent for the lowest-ranked quintile. The difference of 7.5 percent is not much higher than the spread in their dividend yields. The yields are 0.1 percent and 6 percent for the highest and lowest ranked quintiles, respectively, so the dividend yield spread is 5.9 percent. The results for growth in operating income before depreciation yield similar conclusions.

To sum up, analysts forecast that long-term earnings growth for the top quintile outperforms the bottom quintile by 16.4 percent. The realized gap in five-year growth rates, however, is only 7.5 percent. Much of the spread in realized growth reflects differences in dividend yields, and some is due to survivorship bias in the top quintile. After accounting for these influences, analyst forecasts add information only over shorter horizons.

### *B. Portfolio Growth Rates*

Issues of survivorship bias and low or negative base-year values for income before extraordinary items are major concerns. Table IX takes another approach to measuring growth rates that tries to work around these concerns. Specifically,

after ranking stocks by IBES long-term forecasts at each year-end, we form a value-weighted portfolio of the stocks in each quintile. Value-weighting affords some degree of robustness to our measures, to the extent that problems in measuring growth are less severe for large companies. We then track over the postformation period the income before extraordinary items of the portfolio as a whole. If a stock is delisted in a year after portfolio formation, we assume it generates the average income of the remaining firms in that year. Then, at the end of the year, we take the proceeds from liquidating nonsurviving firms and reallocate them proportionally across the surviving stocks. As a result, we are able to use all eligible companies to calculate growth rates, regardless of whether they survive over the full growth horizon, or whether they have positive earnings in the base year.<sup>11</sup> The portfolio approach, however, is not without its drawbacks. As firms drop out of the sample and the funds from their liquidation are reinvested in the remaining firms, over time, the portfolio can build up large stakes in a relatively small number of surviving firms who tend to have relatively high growth rates. The implication is that long-term portfolio growth rates for cases where survivorship bias is acute, such as the fastest-growing firms in the top quintile by IBES forecasts as noted above, should be interpreted with caution.

The results for the portfolios' long-term growth rates are in line with our earlier findings. IBES long-term forecasts are essentially unrelated to realized growth in income before extraordinary items beyond one or two years out. For example, over the five postformation years (Panel D), the bottom and top quintile portfolios on average experience growth rates of 8 and 11.3 percent per year, respectively. The spread of 3.3 percent in the portfolios' growth rates is smaller than the gap between their dividend yields (5.6 percent).

One difference between our results for individual stocks' growth rates and the portfolios' growth rate concerns the performance of the bottom quintile in the first postranking year. In the year immediately following portfolio formation, the bottom quintile portfolio experiences a strong recovery. Its short-term growth rate (12.6 percent) falls slightly short of the top quintile portfolio's growth rate (13.6 percent). This difference from the earlier results based on individual stocks reflects several methodological details, specifically the use of value-weights, the inclusion in the portfolios of nonsurviving firms as well as firms with negative income, and the use of a time-series average of the yearly portfolio growth rates rather than the cross-sectional medians. In particular, since firms with low IBES forecasts generally tend to start with low or negative values of income before extraordinary items at the portfolio formation date, the growth rate over the following year is likely to be high.<sup>12</sup>

Analysts' forecasts substantially overstate realized long-term growth in the top three quintile portfolios. In the top-ranked quintile, for example, the median projected future growth rate is about 22.4 percent, but the portfolio's realized

<sup>11</sup>The portfolio approach to measuring growth rates is described further in Chan et al. (2000, 2001).

<sup>12</sup>Our results parallel the findings for the prospective earnings growth of beaten-down value stocks documented in Lakonishok et al. (1994).

growth is only 11.4 percent over three years and 11.3 percent over five years. These results suggest that, in general, caution should be exercised before relying too heavily on IBES long-term forecasts as estimates of expected growth in valuation studies. The bottom quintile portfolios by IBES forecasts predominantly comprise firms in mature industries whose growth prospects are relatively unexciting, so analysts' estimates come closer to the mark here. For instance, about 25 percent of the firms in the first quintile are utilities.

The long-term estimates of analysts may be overly optimistic for several reasons. One explanation draws on evidence from studies in psychology that individuals' forecasts are susceptible to cognitive biases.<sup>13</sup> For example, the confirmation bias suggests that individuals tend to focus on evidence that supports their beliefs, while downplaying other information that is inconsistent. In this regard, analysts' estimates will be particularly bullish for glamour stocks that have shown strong past growth and which enjoy favorable investor sentiment. In addition, an analyst is employed by a brokerage firm and is expected to make contributions beyond predicting earnings. Up-beat forecasts may encourage trading by investors and thereby raise commission income, as well as generate investment banking business from firms that receive favorable coverage. The general perception is that these aspects of the brokerage and investment banking business are larger, and their links to analysts closer, in the U.S. market than overseas. As one piece of evidence that such considerations may lead to inflated forecasts, IBES estimates as of mid-2001 for U.S. companies project long-term growth of about 18 percent on average. At the same time, in non-U.S. markets, analysts are forecasting long-term growth for companies of roughly the same size to average 11 percent. Perhaps the close ties that exist in practice between the brokerage and investment banking businesses in the U.S. market foster an environment where analysts tend to be less impartial and err on the side of optimism.

## VII. Regression Models

We close out our analysis by gathering all the variables we have previously considered individually into one model in order to take our best shot at forecasting growth. Table X reports the results from cross-sectional regressions to predict future growth in operating profits. The model is

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{it+j} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 PASTGS5_{it} + \beta_2 EP_{it-1} + \beta_3 G_{it-1} + \beta_4 RDSALES_{it} \\
 & + \beta_5 TECH_{it} + \beta_6 BM_{it} + \beta_7 PASTR6_{it} + \beta_8 IBESLTG_{it} + \beta_9 DP_{it} \\
 & + \varepsilon_{it+j}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

The dependent variable,  $y_{it+j}$ , is the rate of growth for firm  $i$  over year  $t+j$  in sales (SALES), operating income before depreciation (OIBD), or income before extraordinary items available to common equity (IBEI). We forecast growth over the first year following sample selection, over the three and five years subsequent to sample selection, and over the second to fifth subsequent years.

<sup>13</sup>The evidence is discussed in Kahnemann and Riepe (1998) and Fisher and Statman (2000).

Table X  
**Forecasting Regressions for Growth Rates of Operating Performance**

At every calendar year-end, a cross-sectional regression model is used to forecast growth rates of operating performance,  $y_{it+j}$  for firm  $i$  over the following one to five years for all firms in the sample with available data. The model is:

$$y_{it+j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PASTGS5_{it} + \beta_2 EP_{it-1} + \beta_3 G_{it-1} + \beta_4 RDSALES_{it} + \beta_5 TECH_{it} + \beta_6 BM_{it} + \beta_7 PASTR6_{it} + \beta_8 IBESLITG_{it} + \beta_9 DP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it+j}$$

The dependent variable is growth in: sales (SALES); operating income before depreciation (OIBD); or income before extraordinary items available to common equity (IBEI). The variables used to forecast a firm's growth are PASTGS5, the growth in sales over the five years prior to the sample selection date; EP, the ratio of income before extraordinary items available to common equity to equity market value; G, the sustainable growth rate given by the product of return on equity (income before extraordinary items available to common equity relative to book equity) and plowback ratio (one minus the ratio of total dividends to common equity) to income before extraordinary items available to common equity; RDSALES, the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; TECH, a dummy variable with a value of one for a stock in the technology sector and zero otherwise; BM, book-to-market ratio; PASTRGs, the stocks prior six-month compound rate of return; IBESLITGs, the IBES consensus forecast for long-term growth; and DP the dividend yield, accumulated regular dividends per share over the last twelve months divided by current price per share.

Growth in:	PASTGS5	EP	G	RDSALES	TECH	BM	PASTR6	IBESLITG	DP	R <sup>2</sup>
SALES	0.0890 (3.7)	0.1641 (6.0)	0.0141 (1.5)	0.0979 (1.6)	-0.0038 (-0.5)	-0.0184 (-4.7)	0.0365 (3.0)	0.3018 (6.1)	-0.5258 (-4.8)	0.0709
OIBD	-0.0729 (-1.3)	-0.2400 (-3.3)	0.0064 (0.9)	0.2047 (1.0)	-0.0045 (-0.3)	0.0031 (0.4)	-0.0592 (-2.4)	0.2334 (2.6)	-0.5390 (-3.9)	0.0274
OBEI	-0.0971 (-1.4)	-0.3982 (-3.3)	-0.0242 (-1.5)	-0.0024 (-0.0)	-0.0162 (-0.7)	0.0093 (0.4)	-0.0621 (-2.0)	0.1179 (0.9)	-0.9564 (-3.5)	0.0263
SALES	0.0469 (1.3)	0.1400 (5.4)	0.0099 (1.6)	0.0974 (3.1)	0.0014 (0.6)	-0.0253 (-9.2)	0.0311 (6.8)	0.1901 (9.3)	-0.5758 (-6.4)	0.0984
OIBD	-0.0547 (-1.5)	-0.0554 (-1.8)	0.0014 (0.1)	0.3453 (3.1)	-0.0127 (-3.2)	-0.0073 (-1.1)	-0.0089 (-1.7)	0.1147 (2.0)	-0.4060 (-2.6)	0.0296
IBEI	0.0087 (0.5)	-0.1881 (-6.0)	0.0011 (0.1)	0.3436 (2.4)	-0.0191 (-2.9)	-0.0061 (-0.4)	-0.0279 (-6.5)	0.0758 (0.9)	-0.0630 (-0.3)	0.0257

(A) Growth Rate in Year  $t+1$

(B) Annualized Growth Rate over Years  $t+1$  to  $t+3$

Table X—continued

	(C) Annualized Growth Rate over Years $t+1$ to $t+5$									
SALES	0.0252 (0.7)	0.1074 (10.5)	0.0067 (3.6)	0.0931 (6.8)	0.0014 (0.4)	-0.0260 (-7.4)	0.0227 (3.2)	0.1538 (3.1)	-0.5446 (-16.6)	0.1175
OIBD	-0.0645 (-3.0)	-0.0146 (-0.6)	-0.0035 (-0.5)	0.3476 (7.6)	-0.0115 (-10.3)	-0.0069 (-1.8)	-0.0133 (-2.3)	0.1227 (1.5)	-0.2675 (-7.4)	0.0367
IBEI	-0.0163 (-4.2)	-0.1222 (-2.3)	-0.0098 (-0.6)	0.2493 (3.7)	-0.0133 (-3.0)	-0.0095 (-1.0)	-0.0293 (-2.8)	0.0729 (0.9)	-0.0917 (-0.7)	0.0313
SALES	0.1128 (2.7)	0.0351 (1.8)	0.0628 (2.3)	0.2554 (4.3)						0.0507
OIBD	-0.0080 (-0.2)	-0.0518 (-3.3)	-0.0166 (-0.7)	0.3779 (13.1)						0.0150
IBEI	0.0311 (25.5)	-0.1295 (-3.8)	-0.0675 (-1.5)	0.2229 (2.4)						0.0148
	(D) Annualized Growth Rate over Years $t+2$ to $t+5$									
SALES	0.0175 (0.5)	0.0983 (5.0)	0.0060 (2.9)	0.1020 (5.6)	0.0007 (0.2)	-0.0273 (-6.3)	0.0218 (3.7)	0.1237 (2.8)	-0.5122 (-20.1)	0.0902
OIBD	-0.0665 (-2.1)	0.0136 (1.0)	-0.0147 (-1.1)	0.3856 (4.9)	-0.0130 (-7.7)	-0.0049 (-0.9)	-0.0042 (-0.3)	0.1354 (1.7)	-0.3197 (-2.7)	0.0335
IBEI	0.0119 (0.6)	-0.0932 (-2.6)	0.0018 (0.1)	0.2897 (12.8)	-0.0174 (-5.8)	-0.0075 (-0.6)	-0.0245 (-1.8)	0.0809 (1.0)	-0.0538 (-0.4)	0.0268
SALES	0.0962 (2.1)	0.0279 (1.6)	0.0655 (3.1)	0.2515 (5.2)						0.0398
OIBD	-0.0097 (-0.2)	-0.0255 (-1.2)	-0.0023 (-0.1)	0.3840 (8.6)						0.0144
IBEI	0.0534 (3.2)	-0.1065 (-3.3)	-0.0448 (-0.8)	0.2310 (5.5)						0.0144

Growth in each operating performance variable is measured on a per share basis as of the sample formation date, with the number of shares outstanding adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends. Values of *PASTG5*, *RDSALES*, *EP*, *G*, and *PASTR6* are Winsorized at their 5th and 95th percentiles; *IBESLIG* is Winsorized at its 1st and 99th percentiles; and *DP* is Winsorized at its 98th percentile. Stocks with negative values of *BM* are excluded. In the regressions for *OIBD* or *IBEI*, firms with negative values of the operating performance variable in the base year are excluded, as are stocks with ratios of price to the operating performance variable above 100. The reported statistics are the averages over all years of the estimated coefficients, with *t*-statistics in parentheses, as well as the average  $R^2$  of the model. In panels B to D, standard errors are based on the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) adjustment for serial correlation.

To see whether high past growth is a precursor to future growth, we use *PASTGS5*, the growth rate in sales over the five years prior to the sample selection date. Sales growth is correlated with earnings growth, but is much less erratic and so should yield a relatively more reliable verdict on whether past growth helps to predict future growth.<sup>14</sup>

Simple theoretical models of earnings growth suggest one set of variables that, in principle, should help to predict growth. For instance, a firm's earnings-to-price ratio, *EP*, is widely interpreted as impounding the market's expectations of future growth. We measure this as the firm's income before extraordinary items in the year prior to the sample selection date, relative to its price at the sample selection date. Similarly, in the standard constant-growth valuation model, a firm's sustainable growth rate is given by the product of its return on equity and its plowback ratio. Our proxy for this measure is *G*, where return on equity is measured as the firm's earnings before extraordinary items in the year prior to sample selection, divided by book equity in the preceding year; plowback is one minus the ratio in the prior year of dividends to income before extraordinary items.<sup>15</sup> Finally, to capture the firm's investment opportunities, we use the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales, *RDSALES*. The intensity of R&D relative to sales is widely used in practice as an indicator of how much resources a firm is investing in future growth opportunities (see, e.g., Chan et al. (2001)). When a firm has no R&D spending, we set this variable to zero, so all firms are eligible for the regression.

The forecast equation also incorporates variables that are popularly thought to connote high growth. Firms in technologically innovative industries, or more generally, growth stocks as measured by low book-to-market ratios, are popularly associated with high growth. High past returns for a stock may signal upward revisions in investors' expectations of future growth. Analysts' long-term forecasts are another proxy for the market's expectations of future growth. Finally, the dividend yield may provide information on the firm's investment opportunities and hence ability to grow future earnings. Correspondingly, the other forecasting variables are *TECH*, a dummy variable with a value of one for a stock in the pharmaceutical and technology sectors (defined as in Panel A of Table IV) and zero otherwise; *BM*, the firm's book-to-market value of equity; *PASTR6*, the stock's prior six-month compound rate of return; *IBESLTC*, the *IBES* consensus forecast of long-term growth; and *DP*, the ratio of dividends per share cumulated over the previous 12 months to current price. To be eligible for inclusion in the regression at a given horizon, a firm must have nonmissing values for all the predictors. In addition it must have a positive base-year value for the operating performance indicator in question, so as to calculate a growth rate. To screen out

<sup>14</sup> Results using past five-year growth in *OIBD* or *IBEI* as predictor variables indicate that these variables do a worse job in capturing any persistence in growth.

<sup>15</sup> Firms with negative value of book equity are dropped from the sample for the regression. In cases where the measure for sustainable growth is negative (when income is negative, or when dividends to common exceed income so the plowback ratio is negative), we set the sustainable growth rate variable *G* to zero.

outliers due to low values in the base year, we exclude cases where the ratio of the price to the operating performance variable exceeds 100 in the base year.

The model is estimated each year-end, yielding a time series of estimated coefficients and the adjusted  $R^2$ . Means for the time series, and  $t$ -statistics based on the standard error from the time series, are reported in Table X. Standard errors from the overlapping regressions in Panels B to D use the Hansen–Hodrick (1980) correction for serial correlation.

The results in Table X deliver a clear verdict on the amount of predictability in growth rates. In line with our earlier results, it is much easier to forecast growth in sales than growth in variables such as *OIBD* and *IBEI*, which focus more on the bottom line. For example, the forecasting model that has the highest adjusted  $R^2$  in Table X is the equation for five-year growth in sales (11.75 percent; Panel C). By comparison, the adjusted  $R^2$  in the equations for *OIBD* and *IBEI* barely exceed 3 percent, so there is relatively little predictability for growth in these variables. If anything, our results may be overstating the predictability in growth. Our cross-sectional regressions are reestimated monthly, so we let the coefficients in the model change over time. As a check on the robustness of our results, we also replicated the regressions in the table using growth rate ranks (ranging from zero for the firm with the lowest growth rate in that year to one for the firm with the highest growth rate). The results from the growth rank regressions echo the findings in Table X.

Our full model includes a total of nine predictors, and the correlations between some of them are quite high. As a result, sorting out the relative importance of each variable is not straightforward. Focusing on the models for *OIBD* and *IBEI*, no variable has coefficients that are statistically significant across all forecasting horizons. The coefficient of past sales growth *PASTGS5* is generally negative, suggesting that there are reversals in growth rates. When past sales have been declining, income levels tend to be low in the base year, resulting in relatively higher future growth rates.<sup>16</sup>

At least over longer horizons (Panels B to D), R&D intensity, *RDSALES*, has the strongest forecast power. In accordance with economic intuition, firms that are investing heavily in R&D, and thereby building up their intangible capital base, on average tend to be associated with elevated future growth. Specifically, a firm that spends 10 percent of its sales on R&D tends to have higher five-year growth in *IBEI* by about 2.5 percent, compared to a firm with no R&D (Panel C). However, the high correlation between *RDSALES* and variables like *TECH* or *DP* suggests caution is warranted in interpreting this result.

The variable *IBESLTG* is provided by supposed experts, and is widely used as a proxy for expected future growth. Its coefficient has the expected positive sign, but it is not statistically significant in the equations for *IBEI*. This variable does somewhat better in the equations for *OIBD*, especially over shorter horizons. In general, however, *IBESLTG* does not have higher forecast power than the divi-

<sup>16</sup>The effect of extremely low base-year values is mitigated to some extent because we drop from the regression cases where the ratio of the price to operating performance indicator exceeds 100 in the base year. However, this is only a partial solution.

dividend yield,  $DP$ , which can be viewed as another proxy for the firm's investment opportunities.<sup>17</sup> In terms of predicting long-term growth, the forecasts of highly paid security analysts are about as helpful as the dividend yield, a piece of information that is readily available in the stock listings of most newspapers.

In line with the results in Table VIII, a low earnings yield  $EP$  is associated with higher future growth rates, especially for *IBEI*. However, the association is driven by a relatively small number of cases with unusually low base-year earnings. Low values of the earnings base result in a low earnings yield, and given that the firm survives, in an unusually high future growth rate. This explanation agrees with the results in Table VIII, where the relation between  $EP$  and future growth is confined to companies with the highest growth rates. As further confirmation of this line of reasoning, when we use growth in a variable such as *OIBD*, which is less prone to the problem of a low base level,  $EP$  does a poor job of forecasting in Table X.

The coefficient of the technology dummy  $TECH$  is highly significant in many cases, but it generally has an unexpected sign. This may be due to the high correlation between  $TECH$  and  $RDSALES$ . For example, dropping  $RDSALES$  from the model substantially reduces the  $t$ -statistics for  $TECH$  (although its coefficient retains a negative sign).

Neither the book-to-market ratio nor our proxy for sustainable growth  $G$  reliably predicts growth in *OIBD* and *IBEI*. Contrary to the conventional notion that high past returns signal high future growth, the coefficient of  $PASTR6$  is negative. The explanation for this result echoes our explanation for our findings with respect to  $EP$ . When a firm's near-term prospects sour and current earnings are poor, stock returns tend to be disappointing as well. Once again, these cases of low base levels of earnings may induce a negative association between past return and future growth.

Panels *C* and *D* also provide results that are based on a simple textbook model for predicting growth. Here the predictor variables are earnings yield, sustainable growth, and R&D intensity. The textbook model has weak forecast power. For example, over a five-year horizon, the adjusted  $R^2$  from the equation for *IBEI* is only 1.48 percent.

### VIII. Summary and Conclusions

We analyze historical long-term growth rates across a broad cross section of stocks using a variety of indicators of operating performance. All the indicators yield a median growth rate of about 10 percent per year (with dividends reinvested) over the 1951 to 1998 period. With dividends taken out, the median estimate is the same magnitude as the growth rate of gross domestic product over this period, between 3 and 3.5 percent in real terms. Given the survivorship bias underlying the growth rate calculations, the expected growth rate is likely to be lower. Based on these historical values and the low level of the current dividend

<sup>17</sup> Forecasting models with *IBESLTG* and  $DP$  as the only predictors yield qualitatively similar conclusions. In particular, the dividend yield does at least as well as the consensus forecast in forecasting growth.

yield, looking forward, the expected return on stocks in general does not appear to be high. In particular, the expected return using a constant-growth dividend valuation model is about 7.5 percent, assuming there is no mispricing.

Expectations about long-term growth are also crucial inputs in the valuation of individual stocks and for estimating firms' cost of capital. At year-end 1999, a sizeable portion of the market commanded price-earnings multiples in excess of 100. Justifying such a multiple under some relatively generous assumptions requires that earnings grow at a rate of about 29 percent per year for 10 years or more. Historically, some firms have achieved such dazzling growth. These instances are quite rare, however. Going by the historical record, only about 5 percent of surviving firms do better than a growth rate of 29 percent per year over 10 years. In the case of large firms, even fewer cases (less than 1 percent) would meet this cutoff. On this basis, historical patterns raise strong doubts about the sustainability of such valuations.

Nonetheless, market valuation ratios reflect a pervasive belief among market participants that firms who can consistently achieve high earnings growth over many years are identifiable *ex ante*. The long-term growth expectations of one influential segment of the market, security analysts, boldly distinguish between firms with strong and weak growth prospects. To see whether this belief that many firms can achieve persistently high growth holds up in reality, we use an experimental design that singles out cases where a firm consistently delivers favorable growth for several years in a row. Our results suggest that there is some persistence in sales revenue growth. The persistence in sales does not translate into persistence of earnings, however. Even though we measure consistency against a hurdle that is not particularly challenging (the median growth rate), there are few traces of persistence in growth of operating income before depreciation, or in income before extraordinary items. For example, on average three percent of the available firms manage to have streaks in growth above the median for five years in a row. This matches what is expected by chance. The evidence for persistence is still slim under more relaxed criteria for consistency in growth. All in all, the evidence suggests that the odds of an investor successfully uncovering the next stellar growth stock are about the same as correctly calling coin tosses.

A skeptic might argue that while there is little persistence for the population at large, specific segments of the market are able to improve earnings steadily over long periods. In particular, popular sentiment views firms in the pharmaceutical and technology sectors, along with glamour stocks, as being able to maintain consistently high growth rates. To accommodate this argument, we narrow our search to these subsets of firms. While there is persistence in sales growth, when it comes to growth in bottom-line income, over long horizons, the likelihood of achieving streaks is not much different from sheer luck. Conversely, value firms who are out of favor do not seem to do much worse, although survivorship bias makes it difficult to deliver a definitive verdict. To narrow the search even more, we check whether firms with consistently high past growth manage to maintain their performance going forward. While past growth carries over to future sales growth, the income variables do not display strong persistence.

There is a widespread belief that earnings-to-price ratios signal future growth rates. However, the cross-sectional relation between earnings yields and future growth is weak, except possibly in the cases of firms ranked highest by realized growth. For these firms, an inverse association between ex ante earnings yields and growth may arise because they start from a battered level of earnings in the base year, so future growth is high. In light of the noisiness of the earnings yield measure, academic and practitioner research mainly focuses on other valuation ratios such as book-to-market and sales-to-price. These multiples, which are better behaved, show little evidence of anticipating future growth. On the other hand, firms that enjoy a period of above-average growth are subsequently rewarded by investors with relatively high ratios of sales-to-price and book-to-market. Conversely, investors tend to penalize firms that have experienced poor growth. These results are consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis of La Porta (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997).

Additionally, it is commonly suggested that one group of informed participants, security analysts, may have some ability to predict growth. The dispersion in analysts' forecasts indicates their willingness to distinguish boldly between high- and low-growth prospects. IBES long-term growth estimates are associated with realized growth in the immediate short-term future. Over long horizons, however, there is little forecastability in earnings, and analysts' estimates tend to be overly optimistic. The spread in predicted growth between the top and bottom quintiles by IBES forecasts is 16.4 percent, but the dispersion in realized five-year growth rates is only 7.5 percent. On the basis of earnings growth for portfolios formed from stocks sorted by IBES forecasts, the spread in realized five-year growth rates is even smaller (3.3 percent). In any event, analysts' forecasts do not do much better than a naive model that predicts a one-for-one tradeoff between current dividend yield and future growth per share.

A regression forecasting model which brings to bear a battery of predictor variables confirms that there is some predictability in sales growth, but meager predictability in long-term growth of earnings. Only about three percent of the variation in five-year earnings growth rates is captured by the model. One variable that stands out is the level of research and development intensity, suggesting that a firm's intangible assets may have an important influence on its future performance. On the whole, the absence of predictability in growth fits in with the economic intuition that competitive pressures ultimately work to correct excessively high or excessively low profitability growth.

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